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The Liquidity Crisis, Investor Sentiment, and REIT Returns and Volatility
Abstract
The real estate investment trust (REIT) industry experienced a liquidity crisis resulting from
reduced access to credit commitments as banks were restoring their balance sheets during the 20072009 financial crisis. Employing generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity
(GARCH) models we examine the impact of the liquidity crisis and investor sentiment on REIT
returns and volatility over the sample period from December 2001 to February 2013. We find that
the liquidity crisis negatively impacts REIT returns and helps explain increases in volatility; this
finding is robust to multiple specifications. We show that investor sentiment is a significant factor
in explaining the REIT return generating process with institutional sentiment playing a dominating
role over individual sentiment; furthermore, institutional sentiment was the only relevant sentiment
variable during liquidity crisis.
Keywords: Investor Sentiment, Liquidity Crisis, REIT returns, REIT volatility, GARCH-M
JEL Classification Codes: G11, G14, G23

1. Introduction
The financial crisis of 2007-2009 and the recession that accompanied it are catalogued as
the worst economic downturn in U.S. history since the Great Depression of the 1930s. The
causes that prompted the crisis remain under debate; however, a large consensus points to lenient
mortgage loan underwriting, aggressive lending practices by financial institutions, financial
innovation through the creation of new funding products, historically low interest rates, and lax
credit markets. The aggressive lending behavior led to the origination of subprime loans, which
together with the real estate mortgage-backed securities market, contributed to the boom and
subsequent bust of the housing bubble and the crash of the financial system. The U.S. Treasury
Office of Financial Stability recognizes that for the first time in 80 years, the U.S. financial
system stood on the verge of collapse. This financial crisis quickly spilled over to other
industries further weakening the U.S. economy.
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The real estate investment trust (REIT) industry did not stand unaffected from this
economic disaster. REITs experienced a liquidity crisis as a consequence of the credit crunch
that loomed in the financial industry during the period from 2008Q4 to 2009Q2 (Case et al.,
2012). Since government regulations constrain REITs’ ability to retain their net income through
minimum dividend payment requirements, they must have access to funds either through capital
markets, debt markets, or banks in order to grow. The REIT industry experienced significant
erosion in its equity and debt capital raising abilities during this period. At the same time, bank
lending came to a near halt making liquid funds a scarce resource for borrowers including those
linked to the REIT industry. Bank funding primarily through credit line facilities is important
since it provides REIT managers with leeway in their capital structure decisions and with the
flexibility to utilize this source rather than the capital markets during unfavorable times. With
REIT retained earnings representing a marginal funding source of new investments in the
industry, it is plausible that a fall out in liquidity from traditional sources would place significant
pressure on REITs’ ability to operate effectively. The changes in market conditions and REITs
mandatory minimum dividend payment structure serve to motive this paper.
As market conditions deteriorated during the crisis, investors were pressed to take
financial decisions under uncertainty and pressure. The events in the midst of the financial crisis
and the market turmoil led to increased volatility in measures of institutional and individual
investor sentiment. The increase in volatility is important since a body of literature has
documented a relationship between investor sentiment and the formation and volatility of asset
prices including REIT prices. Our research is further motivated by the noise trader risk theory
which posits that security prices suffer deviations from intrinsic values due to noise introduced
by the herding trading behavior of investors trading on non-fundamental information (De Long

2

et al., 1990). Interestingly, this increase in sentiment volatility is more evidently portrayed by
changes in institutional investor sentiment which are usually less volatile compared to changes in
individual investor sentiment. For the period from December 2001 to February 2013, sentiment
volatility is markedly higher after the second quarter of 2007. Exhibit 1 shows the changes in
both individual and institutional investor sentiment for the sample period from December 2001
to February 2013. In Exhibit 1, institutional investor sentiment realizes its lowest values after the
beginning of the crisis denoting negative expectations during the crisis period. In contrast,
changes in individual investor sentiment appear not to significantly react to the crisis period.
In this paper, we assess whether REIT market returns and volatility were significantly
affected by the 2008-2009 REIT liquidity crisis and test the role of investor sentiment on the
REIT return generating process. This paper adds to the literature on the impact of the liquidity
crisis on REIT sector returns and volatility and to the literature that examines the impact of
investor sentiment on REIT returns. The pressure of the liquidity crunch on REIT prices and the
influence that investor expectations had during the crisis has not been addressed. We provide
evidence on the influence of sentiment on the REIT return generating process, especially during
times of scarce financial liquidity and market turmoil.
Overall, results from generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity in mean
models show that REIT returns decreased significantly while volatility increased significantly
during the 2008Q4-2009Q2 liquidity crisis. Our results support behavioral hypotheses on the
impact of sentiment on security prices (De Long et al., 1990; Barkham and Ward, 1999). In our
results, investor sentiment is observed to play a significant role in both the formation and
volatility of REIT prices. Furthermore, we analyze the impact of expectations from the
heterogeneous REIT investor base by classifying sentiment from institutional and individual
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investors independently. Institutional investor sentiment is observed to have a larger impact on
REIT returns and volatility than individual investor sentiment. Previous research on the
sentiment-return relationship in REITs undermines the influence that institutional ownership has
on the REIT prices and uses the debatable closed-end fund discount as a proxy of investor
sentiment (Lin et al., 2009).1 This paper fills a gap in the behavioral finance literature by
providing evidence on the impact of investor sentiment on a highly regulated industry during
times of market crisis. Our findings imply that investors may use bullish or bearish shifts in
sentiment as a signal for capital allocations in the REIT market, especially from institutional
investors who play a significant role in REIT price formation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of
relevant literature and puts forth our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data employed in this
study. Section 4 explains the methodology. Section 5 discusses the empirical results, and Section
6 concludes.

2. Literature Review
2.1 Investor Sentiment
A body of literature finds a significant relationship between investor sentiment and
returns on diverse financial assets (i.e. Shiller, 1981; De Bondt and Thaler, 1985; Lee et al.,
1991; Lee et al., 2002). Specifically, research in the REIT industry finds evidence that investor
sentiment has a significant impact on REIT returns (Chan et al., 1990; Lin et al., 2009). The
behaviorist approach to asset pricing suggests that although market prices are generally observed
in equilibrium, noise trading can cause pronounced price deviations that arbitrage forces are
unable to correct. This effect on prices intensifies in times of market turmoil and uncertainty
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when sentiment dominates the market given generalized negative expectations about
performance. Despite the evidence, no preceding research explores the sentiment-return
relationship in the REIT industry during times of financial turmoil nor do they directly test the
noise trader hypothesis by considering institutional (sophisticated investor) and individual (noise
trader) sentiment simultaneously in a pricing model as proposed by DeLong et al. (1990).
Using the index of industrial confidence produced by the Confederation of British
Industry, the index of consumer confidence produced by the Gallup Polling Organization and the
index of inflation expectations produced by Money Market International as proxies for investor
sentiment, Barkham and Ward (1999) test the noise trader hypothesis on listed property
companies in the United Kingdom (U.K.). These authors explain that there are two fundamental
types of market participants: “rational participants” that trade on assumptions formed by
unbiased estimates of economic and financial fundamentals and “noise traders” that trade on
pseudo-signals and sentiment. They find that U.K. property companies often trade at a discount
with respect to their net asset value (NAV) and argue that that this deviation in price can be
attributed to unpredictable changes in noise trader sentiment. This evidence suggests that pricing
errors can be driven by noise traders although underlying assets in real estate companies are
tangible and arguably easier to value compared to other types of assets. The noise trader risk
hypothesis has been widely tested in the finance literature and findings show strong support for
the theory. Lee et al. (2002) posit that noise trader risk is a systematic risk factor that should not
be dismissed when modelling returns and volatility of financial securities. However, research has
widely overlooked how the noise trader hypothesis could play a role in REIT price formation.
Based on evidence of increased institutional ownership in REITs in recent years, we
hypothesize that institutional investor sentiment has a significant impact on the REIT return
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generating process while changes in individual investor sentiment should not be a significant
determinant of REIT returns and volatility during the REIT liquidity crisis. Devos et al. (2012)
point out that aggregate institutional holdings peaked at the beginning of 2008 at 58% ownership
and declined to 50% ownership in the second quarter of 2009. Correspondingly, Striewe et al.
(2013) explain that the general trend of REIT institutional ownership is positive with a
significant decline only observed in 2008 and 2009. They report that, on average, 56.8% of REIT
shares are held by institutions in the period from 1998 to 2010. This evidence of significant
institutional ownership potentially diminishes the impact of individual investor sentiment on
REIT returns. Moreover, as previously pointed out, changes in individual investor sentiment
seem more erratic and responded less to the crisis compared to changes in institutional investor
sentiment, providing more support to our hypothesis that institutional investor sentiment may
influence REIT prices more than individual sentiment. Given that large institutional investors
have sizeable capital and frequently trade in blocks that are large enough to influence REIT
industry returns, it is expected that institutions will influence prices in the REIT market more
than individuals.

2.2 The REIT liquidity crisis
REITs are a unique type of firm that are constrained by government regulation to payout
90 percent or more their net income. This characteristic limits their ability to fund new property
development or major property acquisitions using internally-generated funds (Hardin and Hill,
2011). Ott et al. (2005) explain that retained earnings are the identified funding source for only
7% of new REIT investments. Thus, REITs must tap the capital markets or obtain financing from
financial institutions in order to grow and operate. During the 2007-2009 financial crisis, capital
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markets behaved erratically and created shocks to firms dependent on external capital flows to
fund operations (Case et al., 2012). The National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts
(NAREIT) reports that during the REIT liquidity crisis (2008Q4 to 2009Q2) equity REITs raised
$960.12 million via seasoned equity offerings compared to $7,580.71 million raised in the
preceding three quarters. Similarly, equity REITs raised $2,393.30 million via debt offerings
during the crisis compared to $5,172.50 million during the preceding three quarters before the
liquidity crisis.2 These figures illustrate the erosion in capital raising abilities by REITs during
the liquidity crunch.
Ott et al. (2005) highlight the importance of lines of credit to finance growth and to serve
as backup liquidity to fund any cash shortages given the stringent REIT dividend payout policy.
Lines of credit (credit commitments) are contracts that allow REITs to access funds regardless of
the prevailing state of the market at the time of the request and serve as financial slack for REITs
(Ooi et al., 2012). 3 To illustrate the importance of credit commitments to the REIT industry,
unused credit line balances in proportion to credit lines plus cash for REITs represents close to
74% of total liquidity compared to 45% for firms in other industries (Ooi et al., 2012). Credit line
facilities allow borrowing only when and as needed and provide REITs important support to
survive adverse economic conditions without committing to long-term financing. For these
reasons, credit lines are believed to reduce REIT cost of capital and to increase firm value
(Hardin and Hill, 2011). Unfortunately, the financial crisis severely constrained bank lending;
bank balance sheet erosion (and the liquidity hoarding response) hindered banks’ capacity to
fulfill credit line commitments and harshly deteriorated the flow of cash to the REIT industry
leading to a liquidity crisis from 2008Q4 to 2009Q2 (Case et al., 2012).
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3. Data
The sample period includes the latest business cycle as indicated by the National Bureau
of Economic Research (NBER) which spans from December 2001 to February 2013.4 Our
sample covers a periods of expansion that includes the buildup of the housing bubble, subsequent
bust, a full time span of the latest U.S financial crisis along with the REIT liquidity crisis, and
the subsequent mild recovery period. The REIT liquidity crisis extends from October 2, 2008 to
July 2, 2009 (Case et al., 2012). REIT returns are proxied by the FTSE NAREIT U.S. Real
Estate Index which reflects the returns of all U.S. tax-qualified equity REITs recognized by the
National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts. We additionally test for robustness of the
results employing the FTSE NAREIT U.S. Total Return index which takes into account dividend
payments.
To proxy for investor sentiment, we employ survey-based weekly measures of sentiment
compiled by the American Association of Individual Investors (AAII) and Investor’s Intelligence
(II) following Brown and Cliff (2004). Individual investor sentiment is captured by a survey that
is conducted by the AAII on a random sample of its members inquiring on their perception of
market expectations for the following six months. The AAII labels each survey as bullish,
bearish, or neutral. The individual sentiment index is constructed by calculating the difference
between the percentage of bullish responses and bearish responses of the surveys (bull-bear
spread). Institutional investor sentiment is built on a compilation of market performance
expectations from investment advisory newsletters. These perceptions are labeled bullish,
bearish, or hold depending on the recommendations from the advisors. The institutional
sentiment index in this analysis is constructed by calculating the bull-bear spread from the
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percentage of bullish newsletters with respect to the percentage of bearish newsletters. REIT
index and investor sentiment data are retrieved from Thomson’s DataStream.
We use the Fama and French (1992) factors and the default risk (DEF) and term structure
premiums (PREM) as control variables. The Fama-French factors are obtained from Dr. Kenneth
French’s website.5 DEF is the default risk premium defined by the difference between Moody’s
Seasoned Aaa Corporate Bond Yield and the Baa Corporate Bond Yield. PREM is the term risk
premium constructed as difference between the 20-year Treasury bond rate and the one-month
Treasury bill rate. The DEF and PREM factors are also constructed with data from Thomson’s
DataStream. All data is in weekly frequency.

3.1. Descriptive statistics
Exhibit 2 presents the contemporaneous bivariate unconditional correlations for the
variables employed in the empirical analysis. Besides the strong correlation between the two
measures of REIT excess return, the highest correlation coefficients observed are between the
excess return in the market (Rm-Rf) and the two measures of REIT excess returns. Due to the
high correlation between excess NAREIT total and price returns, their corresponding pair-wise
correlations with (Rm-Rf) are both 0.645. The sentiment indices ∆II and ∆AAII display a
correlation of 0.195 which declines slightly to 0.144 during the REIT liquidity crisis. With the
exception of the strong correlation between excess market returns (a control variable) and our
two measures of REIT excess returns (our dependent variables), the low-to-moderate correlations
help mitigate any potential multicollinearity issues that could impact our empirical
specifications.
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Summary statistics are presented in Exhibit 3. As expected, weekly excess NAREIT total
returns (mean of 0.251%) are on average larger than excess NAREIT price returns (mean of
0.160%). It is central to recall that the total NAREIT index takes into account dividends which
are an important source of income for investors making allocations in the REIT industry.
Moreover, it is worth mentioning that both measures of NAREIT excess returns (price and total)
are on average larger than the excess market returns (0.103%). This is consistent with claims
from NAREIT of REIT over-performance with respect to the overall stock market and especially
when dividends are accounted for (NAREIT, 2012).
Changes in individual investor sentiment, our ∆AAII variable, have a noticeably larger
standard deviation of 15.042 when compared to changes in institutional investor sentiment, our
∆II variable, which reflects a standard deviation of 4.908; furthermore, our individual investor
sentiment variable also reflects larger magnitudes in minimum and maximum values during the
entire sample period. During the liquidity crisis, the standard deviation of 1.678 for ∆II and
4.654 for ∆AAII are considerably smaller with respect to the whole sample period; nonetheless,
the standard deviation for ∆II is smaller compared to ∆AAII.

4. Methodology
4.1. REIT industry returns and volatility
Our first specification involves the estimation of the following generalized autoregressive
conditional heteroscedasticity-in-mean (GARCH-M) to examine the impact of the liquidity crisis
on REIT industry returns and conditional variance:
(𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑇 − 𝑅𝑓)𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2 ℎ𝑡 + ∑𝑁
𝑖=1 𝛾𝑖 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 ,

(1)

2
2
ℎ𝑡 = 𝜑1 + 𝜑2 𝜀𝑡−1
+ 𝜑3 𝜀𝑡−1
𝐼𝑡−1 + 𝜑4 ℎ𝑡−1 + 𝜑5 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 .

(2)
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The dependent variable (REIT-Rf)t in the mean equation corresponds to the FTSE NAREIT U.S.
Real Estate Index excess returns. Crisist, which appears in the mean and the variance equations,
is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 during the REIT liquidity crisis from October 2,
2008 to July 2, 2009 and the value of 0 outside the crisis period. Notice that the conditional
variance ℎ𝑡 modeled in equation 2, which captures contemporaneous realizations of volatility
that is often observed to influence excess returns, enters the mean equation and its effect is
captured by 𝛽2. 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of N control variables that are expected to explain REIT industry
excess returns and 𝜀𝑡 is the remainder stochastic term, assumed to follow a normal distribution.
The vector 𝑋𝑖𝑡 includes the Fama-French three-factor model variables that consist of the
excess returns of the market constructed as the value-weighted returns on all NYSE, AMEX, and
NASDAQ stocks minus the one-month Treasury bill rate; SMBt (small minus big) as the average
return on the three small portfolios minus the average return on the three big portfolios for all
stocks based on market capitalization; and HMLt (high minus low) as the average return on the
two value portfolios minus the average return on the two growth portfolios for all stocks based
on the book-to-market ratio. Control variables in 𝑋𝑖𝑡 also include the Fama-French bond factors
DEF and PREM. DEFt is the default risk premium defined as the difference between Moody’s
Seasoned Aaa Corporate Bond Yield and the Baa Corporate Bond Yield. PREMt is the term risk
premium constructed as the difference between the 20-year Treasury bond rate and the onemonth Treasury bill rate. Peterson and Hsieh (1997) address the appropriateness of the FamaFrench variables for REIT return models and find that equity REIT returns are affected by the
market-to-book and size factors as suggested by Fama and French (1992) and by the bond
market factors DEF and PREM (Fama and French, 1993).
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2
In the conditional variance modeled by equation 2, we have that 𝜀𝑡−1
captures the lagged

squared innovations from equation 1. With persistent volatility we expect 𝜑2 to be statistically
2
significant (i.e. the current value of the variance of the errors depends on the realized 𝜀𝑡−1
). 𝐼𝑡−1

is an indicator variable equal to 1 if lagged shocks are positive (i.e. 𝜀𝑡−1 ≥ 0) and 0 if lagged
2
shocks are negative. Hence, the 𝜀𝑡−1
𝐼𝑡−1 term captures the Glosten et al. (1993) threshold

ARCH (TARCH) asymmetric effect of shocks on volatility. We expect the TARCH coefficient
𝜑3 to be negative since positive shocks are observed to cause a downward revision in conditional
variance (Lee et al., 2002). ℎ𝑡−1 are t-1 realizations of conditional variance to account for
additional volatility persistence. Lastly, we include 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 in the variance equation as well to
model not only its mean effects on excess returns but also its potential role on volatility.
Equations 1 and 2 are estimated jointly as a system of equations using maximum
likelihood. The estimation follows the methods proposed in Engle (1982) who introduced the
autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) to simultaneously model the mean and the
conditional variance of a series. A more restrictive homoscedasticity assumption when modeling
the returns of most financial assets is, more often than not, violated. The violation means that
ordinary least squares is not efficient and usual inference procedures are not appropriate.
Bollerslev (1986) extended the (ARCH) modeling process of Engle (1982) to a Generalized
ARCH (GARCH) to allow the conditional variance to be dependent upon previous own lags.
GARCH is typically preferred to ARCH as it is more parsimonious and less likely to breach nonnegativity constraints. We expect that this flexible modeling strategy captures the periods of
unusual large volatility in REITs that come as a response to continuously fluctuating market
conditions. We additionally include two extensions to the methods proposed by Bollerslev. First,
in keeping with basic theory of asset markets we employ a GARCH-M to assess if the return's
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conditional variance affects excess returns. The basic premise is that risk-averse agents will
require compensation for holding risky assets. Second, we model a differentiated effect of
positive and negative innovations on conditional volatility.
Similar specifications to model first and second moments of REIT returns have been used
in empirical research. Papers that examine the relationship between the volatility of different
assets classes and REITs make a strong argument on the appropriateness of GARCH-M to model
REIT returns given the concern of heteroscedasticity (Cotter and Stevenson, 2006; and
Stevenson, 2002).

4.2. The roles of the liquidity crisis and investor sentiment
The analysis of the role of investor sentiment on REIT returns and volatility during the
REIT liquidity crisis begins by examining whether investor sentiment is a significant factor in
modeling REIT returns and volatility during the sample period investigated (December 2001 to
February 2013). We propose the following augmented GARCH-M model:
𝑁

(𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑇 − 𝑅𝑓)𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1 ℎ𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∆𝐼𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∆𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑖=1
2
2
ℎ𝑡 = 𝜑1 + 𝜑2 𝜀𝑡−1
+ 𝜑3 𝜀𝑡−1
𝐼𝑡−1 + 𝜑4 ℎ𝑡−1 + 𝜑5 ∆𝐼𝐼𝑡 + 𝜑6 ∆𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑡

(3)

(4)

in which (REIT-Rf)t in the mean equation 3 are the FTSE NAREIT U.S. Real Estate Index excess
returns, ℎ𝑡 are contemporaneous realizations of the conditional variance and 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of
control variables as described in the previous section. ∆𝐼𝐼 and ∆𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼 are changes in institutional
and individual investor sentiment respectively to test for the impact of changes in sentiment on
REIT excess returns. The conditional variance equation includes ARCH, TARCH, and GARCH
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terms consistent with equation 2 along with changes in institutional and individual investor
sentiment ∆𝐼𝐼 and ∆𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼.
To test whether changes in sentiment have a differentiated effect on REIT returns and
volatility during crisis and non-crisis periods, we augment the GARCH-M model with an
interaction between the change in sentiment for institutional and individual investors and the
dummy variable 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 . The resulting model takes the following form:
𝑁

(𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑇 − 𝑅𝑓)𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1 ℎ𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 ∗ ∆𝐼𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 ∗ ∆𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑖=1
2
2
ℎ𝑡 = 𝜑1 + 𝜑2 𝜀𝑡−1
+ 𝜑3 𝜀𝑡−1
𝐼𝑡−1 + 𝜑4 ℎ𝑡−1 + 𝜑5 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 ∗ ∆𝐼𝐼𝑡 + 𝜑6 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 ∗ ∆𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑡

(5)

(6)

in which the mean includes contemporaneous realizations of conditional variance ℎ𝑡 , changes in
institutional and individual investor sentiment during the crisis Crisist*∆IIt and Crisist*∆AAIIt
respectively and a vector of control variable 𝑋𝑖𝑡 as described previously. (REIT-Rf)t are the FTSE
NAREIT U.S. Real Estate Index excess returns. Consistent with the previous models, the
conditional variance includes ARCH, TARCH, and GARCH terms and the two interactions of
the dummy Crisist and changes in institutional and individual investor sentiment: Crisist*∆IIt and
Crisist*∆AAIIt respectively.

5. Results
5.1. The liquidity crisis and REIT returns and volatility
The estimation results for the models in equations 1 and 2 are presented in Exhibit 4.
Model 1 shows that the contemporaneous volatility ht has a positive and statistically significant
impact on REIT excess returns; this statistical relationship holds for both REIT return indices
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(i.e. the price and total REIT return index). These results are consistent with the orthodox riskreturn investment relationship which posits that higher risk, proxied by volatility in this case,
commands higher returns.
The statistically significant negative coefficients on the liquidity crisis (Crisist) dummy
variable in the mean equation (-8.080 on the model based on excess NAREIT price returns and 7.829 on the model examining excess total returns) provide evidence that excess returns
significantly deteriorated during the REIT liquidity crisis period. The results would suggest that
investors may have rebalanced their portfolios towards lower risk investments and away from
riskier type asset classes thus sacrificing potential return for safety and liquidity. These results
support evidence of REIT investors displaying a “flight to quality” during the economic crisis
(Devos et al., 2012). The positive and statistically significant coefficient on the liquidity crisis
dummy variable in the conditional variance equation in Model 1 suggests that volatility
significantly rose during the liquidity crisis period. As uncertainty increased and the REIT
industry experienced liquidity constraints, REIT industry returns experienced higher volatility as
a reflection of negative expectations regarding future market performance. This finding supports
the view of the importance of REITs access to liquidity either through capital markets or bank
facilities to operate effectively. The results also suggest that the absence of these liquidity
2
sources is viewed unfavorably by investors. As expected, 𝜀𝑡−1
shows positive and statistically

significant coefficients (0.201 for REIT price returns and 0.202 for REIT total returns) implying
that conditional variance heavily depends on prior squared shocks in the mean equation.
2
Negative and statistically significant coefficients for the TARCH term 𝜀𝑡−1
𝐼𝑡−1 show that

negative shocks have a larger impact on volatility than do positive ones, portraying the
asymmetric effect of shocks on conditional variance suggested by Glosten et al. (1993).
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Additionally, consistent with Bollerslev (1986), ht-1 shows positive and statistically significant
coefficients (0.754 for the model based on REIT price returns and 0.750 for the model that
examines REIT total returns) suggesting a relatively high volatility persistence.
Model 2 in Exhibit 4 expands Model 1 by incorporating the Fama-French three-factor
model as a vector of control variables in the mean equation. The coefficients for all three FamaFrench equity factors are positive and significant. Moreover, the Crisist variable continues to
explain REIT returns and volatility based on the negative and statistically significant coefficients
in the mean equation (-7.433 for REIT price returns model and -7.458 for REIT total returns
model) and the positive and statistically significant coefficients in the conditional variance
equation (2.492 for REIT price returns model and 2.490 for REIT total returns model).
Model 3 in Exhibit 4 modifies our benchmark model of equations 1 and 2 by including
the Fama-French bond factors DEFt and PREMt in the vector of controls 𝑋𝑖𝑡 . The results in
Model 3 suggest that bond factors do not significantly explain the observed time series variation
in REIT excess returns suggesting that REITs behave more like equity securities rather than
fixed-income securities during our sample period. These findings are consistent with Boudry et
al. (2012) that observe REITs behaving more like equity rather than fixed-income securities and
unsecuritized real estate in the short-run. The Crisist coefficients remain statistically significant
implying that the crisis plays an important role in modeling REIT excess returns and volatility
even after controlling for the Fama-French bond factors.
Model 4 in Exhibit 4 shows the results for the comprehensive model that includes the
entire set of control variables in addition to the REIT liquidity crisis dummy variable. The results
robustly show that the coefficients on Crisist have the expected signs and are statistically
significant under various model specifications in both the mean and conditional variance
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equations. Moreover, REIT excess returns are significantly lower during the liquidity crisis
period confirming deterioration in market conditions. The substantial decrease in returns is
accompanied by increased volatility in the REIT market during the liquidity crisis providing
evidence of higher risk and uncertainty for REITs. Evidence suggests that REIT impaired access
to liquid funds led to uncertainty regarding the true market value of REIT assets and their
capacity to produce cash flows.

5.2. Investor sentiment and the liquidity crisis
We initially explore the impact of changes in investor sentiment on REIT returns for the
sample period that spans from December 2001 to February 2013. The sample period selected
begins after the 2001 recession to evaluate only the effect of the 2008-2009 REIT liquidity crisis.
The estimation results for the specifications in equations 3 and 4 are presented in Models 1 and 2
of Exhibit 5. Overall, results show that changes in institutional and individual investor sentiment
significantly impact REIT excess returns. Specifically, as portrayed in Model 1, changes in
sentiment are positive and significant in modeling REIT excess returns although changes in
institutional investor sentiment (∆II) appear to have a larger effect than changes in individual
investor sentiment (∆AAII), even after factoring that the standard deviation of ∆AAII is much
larger than of ∆II. Changes in both institutional and individual investor sentiment show a
negative relationship with volatility. This effect is larger in magnitude for changes in institutional
investor sentiment in comparison to changes in individual investor sentiment. These findings
remain qualitatively unchanged whether we are modeling REIT excess price returns or REIT
excess total returns.
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Model 2 shows that the effect of sentiment on returns remains positive and statistically
significant when we include the vector of control variables in the model. ∆II displays a
coefficient of 0.065 significant at the 1% level while ∆AAII has a smaller coefficient of 0.011
significant at the 5% level. The dominance of ∆II is not surprising given the increased levels of
institutional ownership in the REIT industry and predominant institutional investor market
power. In the conditional variance equation in Model 2, it is worthy to point out that after
including the ARCH, TARCH, and GARCH terms, the impact of ∆AAII becomes statistically
insignificant. On the other hand, the estimates on ∆II are robust to this specification suggesting
that changes in institutional investor sentiment have a negative and statistically significant
impact on REIT volatility. Positive changes in institutional investor sentiment are associated
with reductions in volatility. An interpretation to our findings is that as institutional investors
turn bullish, they tend to hold REITs especially since REIT investors not only purchase this type
of equity for the price appreciation but for the steady stream of dividends; however, as sentiment
turns bearish, probably as a consequence of negative market outlooks, investors will actively
rebalance their portfolios leading to increased volatility. Overall, the results in Exhibit 5 suggest
that investor sentiment is a significant factor in explaining REIT returns during the sample period
from December 2001 to February 2013.
We next examine the impact of changes in sentiment during the 2008-2009 liquidity
crisis. The estimation results for the model in equations 5 and 6 are presented in Exhibit 6.
Model 1 shows the estimates that include the Fama-French framework as controls along with the
interactions Crisist*∆IIt and Crisist*∆AAIIt in the mean equation. The conditional variance
equation includes Crisist*∆IIt and Crisist*∆AAIIt in conjunction with ARCH, TARCH, and
GARCH terms. The results for REIT excess price and total returns are congruent. The findings
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indicate that during the liquidity crisis ∆II significantly impacts REIT excess returns whereas
∆AAII does not. These results differ from the previous analysis that included the entire sample
period which indicates that both individual and institutional investor sentiment influence returns.
Our results suggest that sentiment from individual investors were either too erratic, meaning that
sentiment from bullish and bearish individuals cancelled each other out and thus no impact was
observed, or that institutional investors were the only ones with sufficient market power to
influence returns during the liquidity crisis. As expected, all three Fama-French equity factors
are positive and statistically significant. In the conditional variance equation, results show that
institutional investor sentiment (∆IIt) is negatively and significantly related to volatility whereas
individual investor sentiment (∆AAIIt ) is not a significant factor in explaining volatility during
the liquidity crisis. The TARCH term in the conditional variance equation is not statistically
significant suggesting that there is no asymmetric effect in lagged 𝜀𝑡2 (i.e. lagged squared shocks
have the same effect whether there are positive or negative shocks to excess returns in the mean
equation).
Model 2 in Exhibit 6 expands the model by including the complete vector of control
variables. Our previous results remain materially unchanged. The Fama-French bond factors are
not significant whereas equity factors are all positive and statistically significant. Institutional
investor sentiment appears to positively influence REIT returns and negatively impact volatility
as in the prior model during the liquidity crisis. Overall, these results suggest that although
investor sentiment plays a significant role in the REIT return and volatility generation process,
institutional investors exhibit a greater influence in the REIT industry compared to individual
investors during the liquidity crisis. This may suggest that during the crisis period, noise traders’
role in REIT asset price formation is dampened by institutional investor sentiment and that REIT
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price formation may be driven more by fundamentals if we accept that institutional sentiment is
driven by rational expectations as suggested by Barkham and Ward (1999).

5.3. Augmented Model
We augment the GARCH-M model to simultaneously include ∆IIt and ∆AAIIt for the
complete sample period along with the interactions Crisist*∆IIt and Crisist*∆AAIIt in both the
mean and conditional variance equations. The idea is to test whether the sentiment coefficients
during the liquidity crisis remain robust with the inclusion of sentiment for the entire sample
period. The results are reported in Model 3, Exhibit 6, which are consistent with the findings
presented in the preceding sections. The maximum likelihood estimates imply dominance of
changes in institutional investor sentiment over individual investor sentiment; moreover, changes
in institutional investor sentiment display a coefficient of significantly greater magnitude during
the REIT liquidity crisis compared to the rest of the sample period. This implies that although
institutional investor sentiment significantly impacts returns during the entire sample period,
changes in institutional investor sentiment played a larger and more important role during the
crisis. On the other hand, changes in individual investor sentiment appear only marginally
significant for excess NAREIT price returns in Model 3 though this significance dissipates in the
model for excess NAREIT total returns.
In the case of the conditional variance equation in Model 3 of Exhibit 6, both ∆IIt and
∆AAIIt exhibit a negative relationship with volatility, however, the magnitude of the coefficients
for ∆IIt are larger in magnitude (-0.215 for excess price returns and -0.215 for excess total
returns) in comparison to ∆AAIIt (-0.031 for excess price returns and -0.0374 for excess total
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returns). Model 4 provides additional robustness checks showing estimates that are consistent in
signs and magnitude with the previously reported specifications.

6. Conclusion
The unique dividend policy restrictions of the REIT industry constrain these firms to hold
a diminutive portion of income in retained earnings. This dividend policy restriction forces
REITs to fund new investments by raising cash through costly debt or equity issuance or by
relying on credit commitments from banks and other financial institutions. Research finds that
the latter option is preferable since credit lines serve as financial slack for REITs and do not
impact their capital structure (Ooi et al., 2012). Credit commitments function as cash reserves for
REITs which accounts for close to 74% of total liquidity in this industry in comparison to 45%
registered by firms in general. In summary, credit commitments represent a vital component of
REIT operations and may serve as an indication of REIT financial health.
The 2007-2009 financial crisis triggered market turmoil that had major negative
consequences on the U.S. economy. The financial sector was especially affected by this crisis,
some banks failed and market conditions did not begin to settle until the federal government
intervened. The REIT industry was not immune from this financial disaster. The financial crisis
severely constrained banks, and other financial institutions, eroding their capacity to fulfill credit
commitments to REITs. The diminished flow of cash to the REIT industry led to a severe
liquidity crisis that spanned from 2008Q4 to 2009Q2.
In this paper we estimated various GARCH specifications to find strong empirical
evidence that the liquidity crisis had a statistically significant negative effect on REIT excess
returns. Moreover we also find that the liquidity crisis helped explain the significant increase in
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market volatility. We argue that as liquid funds became scarce, growth and expansion
opportunities diminished and REIT overall financial heath was adversely affected. The REIT
industry outlook was negative and uncertainty flooded the market. Investors in an attempt to
rebalance their portfolios in response to the crisis, created increased volatility during these
troubled times.
According to the behavioral finance viewpoint, asset pricing is affected not only by
economic fundamentals but also by investor sentiment. Bullish investors who have positive
market expectations will affect security prices given their trading patterns; on the other hand,
bearish investor trading will also pressure prices. Research in the REIT industry finds that
investor sentiment is a significant factor in explaining REIT returns and volatility; this paper
explores the relationship between investor sentiment and REIT returns and volatility during the
period spanning from the 2001 recession to February 2013 with a focus on the REIT liquidity
crisis of 2008-2009.
Our results are consistent with behavioral finance explanations. We find that investor
sentiment is a significant factor in explaining REIT returns and volatility during the relevant
sample period. Specifically, both institutional and individual investor sentiment were found to
have a positive and statistically significant effect on returns, however, the point estimates on the
institutional investor sentiment were consistently larger than the individual investor sentiment.
Similarly, the analysis shows that the institutional and individual investor sentiment both have a
negative and statistically significant effect on volatility. Interestingly, while sentiment from these
two markedly different groups of investors are relevant in explaining REIT returns and volatility,
sentiment for institutional investors dominates the effects.
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The results additionally provide strong evidence that sentiment plays an important role
during the REIT liquidity crisis. While the results consistently indicate that institutional investor
sentiment is a significant factor affecting excess returns during the crisis, individual investor
sentiment was no longer significant. A plausible explanation can be derived from the large
increase in institutional holdings in the REIT industry. According to Striewe et al. (2013),
aggregate institutional ownership is recorded at an average of 56.8% of shares outstanding for
the period 1998-2010. Furthermore, institutional investors with sizeable capital have sufficient
market power to influence industry returns which is clearly not the case for individual investors.
Finally, this paper additionally contributes by providing evidence on the relevance of
investor sentiment in the REIT industry. In particular, investors should pay close attention to
changes in institutional investor sentiment especially during times of market turmoil. Overall, the
results suggest that positive (negative) changes in aggregate sentiment will affect REIT returns
positively (negatively) and volatility negatively (positively). Investors may use sentiment as a
signal for capital allocation. These findings offer support to the field of behavioral finance by
highlighting the influence that investor perception and expectations can have on the market.
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Exhibit 1. Changes in institutional and individual investor sentiment
Weekly Changes in Institutional Investor Sentiment
20

Change in II (∆II)

15
10
5
0
-5
-10
-15
-20

Date

Weekly Changes in Individual Investor Sentiment
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Notes: These graphs show changes in institutional and individual investor sentiment from Investor’s Intelligence (II)
and the American Association of Individual Investors (AAII), respectively, for the time period from the end of the
2001 recession in December 2001 to February 2013. The REIT liquidity crisis extends from October 2, 2008 to July
2, 2009.
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Exhibit 2. Correlation table
Exss REIT
Price Ret
Exss REIT
Price Ret
Exss REIT
Total Ret
Crisis*
∆AAII

Exss REIT
Total Ret

Crisis*
∆AAII

Crisis*∆II

Crisis

∆AAII

∆II

Rm-Rf

SMB

HML

DEF

PREM

1.000
0.999

1.000

0.289

0.289

1.000

Crisis*∆II

0.208

0.209

0.144

1.000

Crisis

-0.091

-0.088

0.007

0.098

1.000

∆AAII

0.186

0.184

0.310

0.045

0.003

1.000

∆II

0.284

0.284

0.049

0.342

0.035

0.195

1.000

Rm-Rf

0.645

0.645

0.215

0.181

-0.061

0.172

0.382

1.000

SMB

0.208

0.208

-0.020

0.067

-0.005

0.054

0.170

0.224

1.000

HML

0.481

0.481

0.295

0.100

-0.108

0.067

0.077

0.309

0.004

1.000

DEF

-0.036

-0.033

0.012

0.159

0.860

0.015

0.066

-0.014

0.014

-0.061

1.000

PREM

0.024

0.026

0.006

0.009

0.179

0.009

0.016

0.009

0.064

0.023

0.266

1.000

Notes: This table shows the correlation matrix for the variables employed. Excess NAREIT Price Returns are the weekly REIT industry price returns minus the
risk-free rate. Excess NAREIT Total Returns are the REIT industry total returns minus the risk-free rate, total returns account for dividend payments. The Crisis
dummy variable takes the value of 1 during the REIT liquidity crisis (October 2, 2008 to July2, 2009) and 0 otherwise. The interactions Crisis*∆II and
Crisis*∆AAII represent changes in institutional and individual investor sentiment during the crisis, respectively. ∆II and ∆AAII are changes in institutional and
individual investor sentiment, respectively. Rm-Rf, SMB and HML are the Fama-French equity factors while DEF and PREM are the Fama-French bond factors.
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Exhibit 3. Summary statistics
Variable
Excess NAREIT Price Returns (%)
Excess NAREIT Total Returns (%)
Crisis (dummy)
Crisis*∆AAII
Crisis*∆II
∆AAII
∆II
Rm-Rf (%)
SMB
HML
DEF
PREM

Obs
582
582
585
585
584
585
584
582
582
582
585
584

Mean
0.160
0.251
0.068
0.009
0.044
-0.061
0.017
0.103
0.074
0.062
1.180
2.791

Std. Dev.
3.986
3.990
0.253
4.654
1.678
15.042
4.908
2.626
1.182
1.267
0.506
1.405

Min
-32.461
-32.424
0.000
-33.380
-14.200
-56.900
-17.500
-18.000
-3.870
-7.000
0.599
-0.230

Max
35.106
35.159
1.000
44.310
17.200
50.750
18.100
12.610
3.660
7.600
3.460
4.540

Notes: Excess NAREIT Price Returns are the weekly REIT industry price returns minus the risk-free rate. Excess
NAREIT Total Returns are the REIT industry total returns minus the risk-free rate, total returns account for dividend
payments. The Crisis dummy variable takes the value of 1 during the REIT liquidity crisis (October 2, 2008 to
July2, 2009) and 0 otherwise. The interactions Crisis*∆II and Crisis*∆AAII represent changes in institutional and
individual investor sentiment during the crisis, respectively. ∆II and ∆AAII are changes in institutional and
individual investor sentiment, respectively. Rm-Rf, SMB and HML are the Fama-French equity factors and DEF and
PREM are the Fama-French bond factors.
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Exhibit 4. Effect of REIT liquidity crisis on REIT excess returns and volatility
Model 1

Mean Equation
Parameters
α0
ht
Crisist
Rm-Rft
SMBt
HMLt
DEFt
PREMt
Volatility Equation
Parameters
φ1
2
𝜀𝑡−1
2
𝜀𝑡−1 𝐼𝑡−1
ℎ𝑡−1
Crisist

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Excess NAREIT
Price Returns

Excess NAREIT
Total Returns

Excess NAREIT
Price Returns

Excess NAREIT
Total Returns

Excess NAREIT
Price Returns

Excess NAREIT
Total Returns

Excess NAREIT
Price Returns

Excess NAREIT
Total Returns

-0.032
0.048**
-8.080***

0.071
0.046**
-7.829***

-0.582**
0.145***
-7.433***
0.629***
0.352***
0.557***

-0.506**
0.147***
-7.458***
0.630***
0.357***
0.556***

0.301
0.056**
-8.281***

0.355
0.053**
-8.028***

-0.507
0.051

-0.467
0.055

-0.287
0.153***
-7.038***
0.629***
0.355***
0.556***
-0.433
0.047

-0.252
0.156***
-7.116***
0.631***
0.359***
0.556***
-0.409
0.052

-0.322
0.197***
-0.142***
0.760***
3.360***

-0.315
0.198***
-0.135**
0.756***
3.370***

-0.123
0.168***
-0.167***
0.718***
2.491***

-0.103
0.163***
-0.161***
0.716***
2.483***

-0.328
0.201***
-0.132**
0.754***
3.370***

-0.327
0.202***
-0.125**
0.750***
3.386***

-0.091
0.166***
-0.162***
0.712***
2.492***

-0.081
0.161***
-0.157***
0.711***
2.490***

Model
Diagnostics
Log-likelihood
-1428.11
-1429.05
-1307.76
-1308.14
-1427.37
-1428.36
-1306.84
-1307.25
Wald χ2
10.44***
9.65***
477.58***
475.96***
13.30***
12.34***
485.79***
483.45***
N
582
582
582
582
582
582
582
582
Notes: This table reports the results for the GARCH-M model described by equations 1 and 2 in the methodology section. Each model has two columns: one
reports the results for excess NAREIT price returns and the other for excess NAREIT total returns. The Wald’s test checks for model parameter restrictions under
the null that our set of parameters is equal to zero; the Wald’s test statistic is Chi-square distributed. Sample period is from December 2001 to February 2013. *,
** and *** represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance level respectively.
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Exhibit 5. GARCH-M results. Impact of changes in institutional and individual investor
sentiment on REIT excess returns and volatility.
Model 1
Excess NAREIT
Price Returns

Model 2

Excess NAREIT
Total Returns

α0
ht
Rm-Rft
SMBt
HMLt
DEFt
PREMt
∆IIt
∆AAIIt

0.157

0.247

0.218***
0.026***

0.218***
0.026**

φ1
2
𝜀𝑡−1
2
𝜀𝑡−1 𝐼𝑡−1
ℎ𝑡−1
∆IIt
∆AAIIt

2.612***

2.616***

-0.048***
-0.003**

-0.048***
-0.002**

Excess NAREIT
Price Returns

Excess NAREIT
Total Returns

0.286
0.048*
0.564**
0.358***
0.504***
-0.500
0.021
0.065***
0.011**

-0.067
0.024
0.557***
0.345***
0.481***

-1.429***
0.179***
-0.182***
0.825***
-0.243***
-0.007

-1.436***
0.176***
-0.170***
0.819***
-0.250***
-0.010

0.064***
0.011**

Log-likelihood
-1585.82
-1586.99
-1304.63
-1305.80
Wald χ2
60.69***
60.09***
375.85***
346.09***
N
582
582
582
582
Notes: This table reports the results for the GARCH-M model described by equations 3 and 4 in the methodology
section of the paper. Results are for the sample period from December 2001 to February 2013. Each model has two
columns: one that reports results based on for excess NAREIT price returns and the other that uses excess NAREIT
total returns, respectively The Wald’s test checks for model parameter restrictions under the null that our set of
parameters is equal to zero; the Wald’s test statistic is Chi-square distributed. *, ** and *** represent 1%, 5% and
10% significance level respectively.
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Exhibit 6. GARCH-M Results. Impact of changes in institutional and individual investor sentiment during the REIT liquidity crisis on
REIT excess returns and volatility.
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Excess NAREIT
Price Returns

Excess NAREIT
Total Returns

Excess NAREIT
Price Returns

Excess NAREIT
Total Returns

Excess NAREIT
Price Returns

Excess NAREIT
Total Returns

Excess NAREIT
Price Returns

Excess NAREIT
Total Returns

α0
ht
Rm-Rft
SMBt
HMLt
DEFt
PREMt
Crisist*∆IIt
Crisist*∆AAIIt
∆IIt
∆AAIIt

0.101
-0.006
0.596***
0.347***
0.513***

0.190
-0.005
0.597***
0.350***
0.519**

0.411
-0.002
0.535***
0.350***
0.425***
-0.375
0.031
0.497**
0.023
0.047**
0.010*

0.452
-0.003
0.538***
0.353***
0.422***
-0.336
0.036
0.499**
0.026
0.043**
0.009

0.288
0.005
0.537***
0.333***
0.497***
-0.220
0.040

0.519**
0.039

0.365
0.004
0.599***
0.355***
0.513***
-0.327
0.047
0.535**
0.038

0.321
-0.002
0.546***
0.314***
0.496***
-0.308
0.041

0.519**
0.037

0.336
0.006
0.598***
0.354***
0.513***
-0.386
0.044
0.538***
0.036

0.066***
0.017***

0.066***
0.015***

φ1
2
𝜀𝑡−1
2
𝜀𝑡−1 𝐼𝑡−1
ℎ𝑡−1
Crisist*∆IIt
Crisist*∆AAIIt
∆IIt
∆AAIIt

-0.677**
0.137***
-0.069
0.786***
-0.422***
-0.006

-1.362***
0.086***
-0.079*
0.835***
-0.247***
0.010
-0.215***
-0.031**

-1.384***
0.075**
-0.068
-0.034**
-0.250***
0.014
-0.215***
-0.034**

-0.336
0.217***
-0.107
0.681***
-0.205***
-0.132***

-0.719**
0.160***
-0.072
0.768***
-0.421***
0.036

-0.686*
0.127***
-0.055
0.790***
-0.424***
-0.005

-0.630*
0.155***
-0.094
0.777***
-0.412***
-0.009

-0.647*
0.139***
-0.074
0.783***
-0.417***
-0.006

Log-likelihood
-1305.47
-1305.40
-1304.86
-1304.88
-1289.00
-1289.09
-1300.99
-1302.11
Wald χ2
357.74***
355.25***
360.21***
353.78***
322.59***
321.97***
419.23***
365.85***
N
582
582
582
582
582
582
582
582
Notes: This table reports the results for the GARCH-M model described by equations 5 and 6 in the methodology section of the paper. Model 1 and 2 include the
interactions Crisis*∆II and Crisis*∆AAII which represent changes in institutional and individual investor sentiment during the REIT liquidity crisis, respectively.
Augmented models 3 and 4 additionally include ∆II and ∆AAII for the entire sample period. Each model has two columns that show results for excess NAREIT
price returns and excess NAREIT total returns, respectively. *, ** and *** represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance level respectively.
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1

Chen et al. (1993) and Elton et al. (1998) contest the closed-end fund discount as a proxy of investor sentiment that
solely reflects individual investor sentiment arguing that there is empirical evidence that institutional holdings may
be a factor that contributes to these discounts. Thus, closed-end fund discounts fail to make a proper distinction
between sentiment derived from individuals and institutional investors
2
Data on REIT capital offerings is found at the NAREIT website: https://www.reit.com/data-research/data/reitcapital-offerings. Accessed on October 12, 2015.
3
The credit commitment insurance hypothesis argues that the aggregate level of loan commitments are less
susceptible to changes in the credit market conditions compared to a term or spot loans that are arranged as and
when a firm needs funding from the bank (Sofianos et al., 1990; Morgan, 1998). Only under a materially adverse
change in condition (e.g. a breach of financial covenants) as established in the loan commitment contract may the
lender reduce or refuse to fulfill a request for funds (Ooi et al., 2012).
4
Accessed at http://www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html on April 24, 2013.
5
Accessed on November 29, 2013. http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html
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